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Abstract: MELIBEA is a Spanish database that uses a composite formula with eight 
weighted conditions to estimate the effectiveness of Open Access mandates (registered 
in ROARMAP). We analyzed 68 mandated institutions for publication years 2011-2013 to 
determine how well the MELIBEA score and its individual conditions predict what 
percentage of published articles indexed by Web of Knowledge is deposited in each 
institution’s OA repository, and when. We found a small but significant positive 
correlation (0.18) between MELIBEA score and deposit percentage. We also found that 
for three of the eight MELIBEA conditions (deposit timing, internal use, and opt-outs), 
one value of each was strongly associated with deposit percentage or deposit latency 
(immediate deposit required, deposit required for performance evaluation, unconditional 
opt-out allowed for the OA requirement but no opt-out for deposit requirement). When we 
updated the initial values and weights of the MELIBEA formula for mandate 
effectiveness to reflect the empirical association we had found, the score’s predictive 
power doubled (.36). There are not yet enough OA mandates to test further mandate 
conditions that might contribute to mandate effectiveness, but these findings already 
suggest that it would be useful for future mandates to adopt these three conditions so as 
to maximize their effectiveness, and thereby the growth of OA. 
 
Introduction  
The Open Access (OA) movement (BOAI 2002) arose as a result of two concurrent 
developments: (1) the “serials crisis,” which made research journals increasingly 
unaffordable, hence inaccessible, to researchers’ institutions (Okerson et al 1995; Miller 
et al 2010), even the richest ones (Harvard University Library 2012) and (2) the advent 
of the online medium, which made it possible in principle to make all research journal 
articles freely accessible to all users online.  
The primary target content of OA is refereed research journal articles, and that is the 
only kind of item analyzed in this study. Researchers can provide OA to their journal 
articles in two different ways – by publishing in an OA journal (“Gold OA,” often for a 
publication fee) or by publishing in a subscription journal and, in addition, self-archiving 
the final, peer-reviewed draft online (“Green OA”) (Harnad et al 2004). OA also comes 
in two degrees: “Gratis” OA is free online access. “Libre” OA is free online access plus 
certain re-use rights (Suber 2008). We will only be considering Gratis OA in this study, 
because Gratis OA is (i) a prerequisite for Libre OA, (ii) faces fewer publisher 
restrictions, and (iii) is the most urgently needed by researchers. We will also only be considering Green OA (self-archiving), because (i) the majority of OA to date is Green, 
(ii) it does not entail any payment of fees, (iii) it can be provided by researchers 
themselves, and, as will be explained below, (iv) providing Green OA can be mandated 
by researchers’ institutions and funders (without having to pay any extra fees).  
One might have expected that because of the many advantages provided by OA 
(Hitchcock 2013) – free access for all users, enhanced research uptake and impact, 
relief from the serials crisis, and the speed and power of the online medium – 
researchers would all have hastened to make their papers (Green) OA ever since it 
became possible. But the growth of OA – possible since even before the birth of the 
Web in 1989 (Berners-Lee 1989) -- has actually been surprisingly slow: For example, in 
2009, already two decades after the Web began, Björk et al estimated the percentage of 
OA to be only 20.4% (the majority of it Green). In 2013 Archambault announced close to 
50% OA, but Chen (2014) found only 37.8% and Khabsa & Giles (2014) even less 
(24%). All these studies reported great variation across fields and none took timing 
adequately into account (publication date vs. OA date): Björk et al (2014) pointed out 
that 62% of journals endorse immediate Green OA self-archiving by their authors, 4% 
impose a 6-month embargo, and 13% impose a 12-month embargo; so at least 79% of 
articles published in any recent year could already have been OA within 12 months of 
their date of publication via Green OA alone, 62% of them immediately, if authors were 
actually providing it. 
There are many reasons why researchers have been so slow to provide Green OA even 
though they themselves would be its biggest potential beneficiaries (Harnad 2006). The 
three principal reasons are that (i) researchers are unsure whether they have the legal 
right to self-archive, (ii) they fear that it might put their paper’s acceptance for 
publication at risk and (iii) they believe that self-archiving may be a lot of work. All these 
concerns are groundless but it has become increasingly clear with time that merely 
pointing out how and why they are groundless is not enough to induce authors to go 
ahead and self-archive of their own accord. Researchers’ funders and institutions 
worldwide are beginning to realize that they need to extend their existing “publish or 
perish” mandates so as to make it mandatory to provide OA to researchers’ 
publications, not only for the benefit of (i) the researchers themselves and of (ii) 
research progress, but also to maximize the (iii) return to the tax-paying public on its 
investment in funding the research.  
Funders and institutions are accordingly beginning to adopt OA policies: Starting with 
NIH in the US and the Wellcome Trust in the UK -- soon followed by the Research 
Funding Councils UK, the European Commission, and now President Obama’s 
Directive to all the major US federal funding agencies -- research funders the world over 
are beginning to mandate OA (ROARMAP 2014). In addition, research institutions, the 
providers of the research, are doing likewise, with Harvard, MIT, University College 
London and ETH Zurich among the vanguard, adopting OA mandates of their own that require all their journal article output, across all disciplines, funded and unfunded, to be 
deposited in their institutional OA repositories.  
These first OA mandates, however, differ widely, both in their specific requirements and 
in their resultant success in generating OA. Some mandates generate deposit rates of 
over 80%, whereas others are doing no better than the global baseline for spontaneous 
(un-mandated) self-archiving (Gargouri et al 2013). As mandate adoption grows 
worldwide, it is therefore important to analyze the existing mandates to determine which 
conditions are essential to making a mandate effective. 
We have accordingly analyzed the institutional mandates indexed by MELIBEA, a 
Spanish database that classifies OA mandates in terms of their specific conditions as 
well as providing a score for overall mandate strength. This score is based on a 
composite formula initialized with a-priori values and weights for eight conditions that 
MELIBEA hypothesizes to be predictive of mandate effectiveness (see Figure 3 and 
Table 1). The purpose of our study was (i) to test the predictive power of the overall 
MELIBEA score for mandate strength in terms of deposit rate and deposit timing, (ii) to 
test individually the association of each of the conditions with deposit rate and timing, 
and (iii) to update the initialized values and weights of the MELIBEA formula to reflect 
the empirical findings of (ii).  
What we found was a small but significant positive correlation between MELIBEA score 
and deposit rate. We also found that for three of the eight MELIBEA conditions (deposit 
timing, internal use, and opt-outs), one of their values was most associated with deposit 
rate and latency (immediate deposit required, deposit required for performance 
evaluation, unconditional opt-out allowed for the OA requirement but no opt-out for 
deposit requirement). When we updated the initial values and weights of the MELIBEA 
formula for mandate strength to reflect this association, the score’s predictive power 
was doubled. This suggests that it would be useful to adopt OA mandates with these 
conditions in order to maximize their effectiveness, and thereby the growth of OA. 
Databases Used  
The data for our analysis were drawn from several databases. The ROAR Registry of 
OA Repositories provided a database of all open access repositories (ROAR, 
http://roar.eprints.org). The ROARMAP Registry of OA Repository Mandatory Archiving 
Policies provided the subset of the ROAR repositories that had an OA mandate 
(ROARMAP, http://roarmap.eprints.org). An in-house version of Thomson Reuters Web 
of Science (WoS) database hosted at the Observatoire des sciences et des 
technologies (OST-UQAM) provided the bibliographic metadata for all (WoS-indexed) 
articles published in years 2011-2013 by any author affiliated with the ROARMAP 
subset of institutions with OA mandates that had been adopted by 2011. The MELIBEA 
Directory and Estimator of OA Policies provided a classification of the OA mandates in 
terms of their specific conditions (assigning a numerical value to each option for each 
condition) plus an overall score based on a weighted combination of eight of those conditions as an estimate of mandate strength (MELIBEA 
(http://accesoabierto.net/politicas) (Table 1). 
WoS indexes the 12,000 most cited peer-reviewed academic journals in each research 
area. (This corresponds to slightly more than 11% of the 105,000 peer-reviewed 
journals listed in Ulrich’s Global Serials Directory, http://ulrichsweb.com.) We also used 
the Webometrics Ranking Web of Universities, which estimates institutions’ “excellence” 
based on how many of their published articles are among the top 10% most cited 
articles (the lower the score the higher the rank). (http://webometrics.info). We excluded 
the bottom 19 institutions from our sample as outliers (i.e., those with Webometrics 
ranks beyond 5000th; see Figure 1). To balance representativeness and sample size, 
we also excluded institutions that had fewer than 30 publications during the 2011-13 
time window under study. This yielded 68 institutional mandates for analysis. 
 
  
Figure 1: Distribution of mandated institutions according to Webometrics 
“excellence” ranking based on citedness (lower score means higher rank).  
 
 
Deposit Rate and Deposit Latency 
Each of the 68 institutional repositories was crawled to determine what percentage of its 
WoS-indexed articles had been deposited (deposit rate), and when they were deposited 
(deposit latency, i.e., the delay between publication date, estimated by WoS indexation 
date, and deposit date) for publication years 2011, 2012 and 2013 (crawled in April 
2014). Deposits could be of two kinds: Open Access (OA) or Restricted Access (RA), to comply with publisher OA embargoes. We subtracted publication date from deposit 
date, so negative values mean an article was deposited before publication and positive 
values mean it was deposited after publication (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of institutions’ deposit rates (percentage of WoS 
articles deposited) and deposit latencies (in days, relative to publication 
date) for Open Access (OA) and Restricted Access (RA) Deposits. The 
peak for RA latency is negative (i.e., before publication) and the peak for 
OA latency is positive (i.e., after publication). 
MELIBEA Score for Mandate Strength 
We used each mandating institution’s overall MELIBEA score for mandate strength as 
of April 6 2014. This score is a weighted combination of eight specific individual 
conditions and their respective options (Figure 3) for each OA policy for each mandating 
institution (Table 1). We tested how well the conditions jointly predicted deposit rate and 
deposit latency. Then we analyzed the conditions separately with Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVA) to determine which individual options contributed to deposit rate or latency. 
 
 
 
 40%(𝐶1) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ10%(𝐶2) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ5%(𝐶3) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ10%(𝐶4) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ5% ﾠ(𝐶5) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ10%(𝐶6) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ10%(𝐶7) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ10% ﾠ(𝐶8) 
Figure 3: The eight mandate conditions (renamed C1-C8 here) and their 
initial weights and values in MELIBEA’s formula for mandate strength (See 
Table 1 below to identify the eight conditions). 
 
  
Table 1: The eight conditions (re-numbered) together with the initial values 
assigned by MELIBEA for each option for each condition in the formula for 
the MELIBEA score for mandate strength, Figure 3). Separate ANOVAS 
were done (see below) for the three boldface conditions and options (2, 4, 
7). The other conditions either did not have enough mandate instances (3, 
5, 6) or were irrelevant to this study (1, 8). 
We excluded from this study all OA policies that were not mandates (i.e., compliance 
was not required, only recommended) because our specific interest here is in which of 
the conditions of mandatory OA policies make a contribution to increasing deposit rate 
and/or decreasing deposit latency. For the individual t-tests and ANOVAs testing the 
eight MELIBEA conditions and their respective options separately, three of the 
conditions (Version (C3), Embargo Length (C5), Copyright (C6)) did not have enough 
institutional mandate instances to be tested with an ANOVA; one condition (Theses 
(C8)) was irrelevant to our target content, which was only refereed journal articles; and 
for one condition (Required or Recommended (C1)), our study concerned only the 
mandatory (required) policies, not recommended ones. We accordingly analyzed only 
conditions C2 (Opt-Out), C4 (Deposit Timing) and C7 (Internal Use) with their respective 
options:  
Value -ﾭ‐2 12	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠafter	 ﾠpublication
1 Request 0.5 6	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠafter	 ﾠpublication
2 Requirement -ﾭ‐2 More	 ﾠ	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ12	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠafter	 ﾠpublication
-ﾭ‐2 Unspecified	 ﾠ(‘after	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠstipulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublisher’)
2 No	 ﾠdeposit	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunconditional	 ﾠOA	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out
2 No	 ﾠdeposit	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠbut	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠOA	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out 1 Allow	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcopyright	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠcase	 ﾠby	 ﾠcase
-ﾭ‐1 Deposit	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠand	 ﾠunconditional	 ﾠOA	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out
2	 ﾠ 1
Any	 ﾠpublishing	 ﾠor	 ﾠcopyright	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠOA	 ﾠpolicy
2 Authors	 ﾠretain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐exclusive	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplotation	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐archiving
0.8 Deposit	 ﾠauthor’s	 ﾠversion 1 Authors	 ﾠshould	 ﾠretain	 ﾠcopyright	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible
0.8 Deposit	 ﾠpublisher’s	 ﾠversion -ﾭ‐2 No	 ﾠcopyright	 ﾠreservation
0 Unspecified
2 Yes
0.5 As	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible
2 0 No
2 At	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠacceptance
1.5 At	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublication 2 Yes
0 Unspecified 0 No
1Only	 ﾠmandatory	 ﾠ(required)	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠpolicies
2Not	 ﾠenough	 ﾠinstances
3Inconsistent	 ﾠoptions
4Only	 ﾠjournal	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠrelevant
C8	 ﾠ:	 ﾠTheses	 ﾠ(10%)
4
C7	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ(10%)
C1:	 ﾠMandate	 ﾠor	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠ(40%)
1
C2	 ﾠ:	 ﾠOpt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠ(10%)
C3	 ﾠ:	 ﾠVersion	 ﾠ(5%)
2
C4	 ﾠ:	 ﾠDeposit	 ﾠTiming	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(10%)
C5	 ﾠ:	 ﾠEmbargo	 ﾠLength(10%)
2
C6	 ﾠ:	 ﾠCopyright	 ﾠ(10%)
2,3Condition C2 (Opt-Out): Deposit and OA are both required and (2a) opt-out is not 
allowed from the deposit requirement but conditional opt-out is allowed from the OA 
requirement, on a case-by-case basis; (2b) opt-out is not allowed from the deposit 
requirement but unconditional opt-out is allowed from the OA requirement; (2c) 
unconditional opt-out is allowed from both the deposit and the OA requirements. 
Condition C4 (Deposit Timing): Deposit is required (4a) at time of acceptance, (4b) 
at time of publication, or (4c) time unspecified.  
Condition C7 (Internal Use): Deposit is (7a) required for internal use or (7b) not 
required for internal use. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of MELIBEA scores for OA mandate strength 
 
Power of Initialized MELIBEA Score to Predict Deposit Rate and Latency  
To test the correlation between the MELIBEA score for mandate strength and deposit 
(1) rate and (2) latency, we analyzed OA and RA deposits separately as well as jointly 
(OA + RA). For deposit latency, which was normally distributed, we used the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient. For deposit rate, which was not normally 
distributed (Figure 2), we used permutation tests (Edgington & Onghena, 2007). 
The individual mandate conditions were then tested using a combination of t-tests and 
one-way ANOVAs, with and without permutation testing. Permutation testing consists of 
permuting the values in a sample randomly a large number of times (e.g. 10,000) and 
computing the test statistic for each new sample. The p value is the probability that the 
test statistic of the original sample will occur within the distribution generated. 
Permutation testing does not presuppose homogeneity of variance or normality.  The overall MELIBEA score is a weighted combination of the eight specific conditions of 
OA policies (Table 1), assigning a value to each of their options, and then combining 
them into the weighted formula in Figure 1 (40%(C1) x 10%(C2) x 5%(C3) x 10%(C4) x 
5% (C5) x 10%(C6) x 10%(C7) x 10% (C8)). 
MELIBEA initialized the overall score with these weightings on the 8 conditions as well 
as with their respective option values (on the basis of theory and what prior evidence 
was available). Each of these initialized values and weightings is now awaiting 
evidence-based validation of their power to predict the effectiveness of OA mandates 
(i.e., how many OA and RA deposits they generate, and how soon) so that either the 
values or the weightings can be updated to maximize their predictive power as the 
evidence base grows. At the end of this section we will illustrate how these initial values 
and weightings can be updated based on the present findings so as to make the 
MELIBEA score more predictive of deposit rate and latency. 
Our analysis has found that this initial overall MELIBEA score has a small significant 
positive correlation with deposit rate for OA deposits (Figure 5) but not for RA deposits 
(nor for OA + RA jointly). For deposit latency there is no correlation at all with the overall 
MELIBEA score.  
 
Figure 5: Correlation between MELIBEA mandate strength score and 
deposit rate, by publication year, for RA deposits, OA deposits and RA + 
OA deposits jointly 
 
Effect of Deposit-Timing Condition (C4) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
To update and optimize the weightings on the specific OA policy conditions, we need to 
look at their predictive power individually. As noted, two of the eight conditions are not 
relevant for this study, and for three of the conditions the number of OA policies that 
have adopted them is so far still too small to test their effectiveness. We report here the 
results for only those three conditions (Opt-Out (C2), Deposit Timing (C4) and Internal 
Use (C7)) that have reached testable sample sizes. 
For OA and RA deposits combined, mandates that required deposit “At time of 
acceptance” had a significantly higher deposit rate than mandates that required deposit 
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 ﾠRA“At time of publication” or “Unspecified.” The same pattern is present for each of the 
three years, significant for year 2011 and almost significant for all three years combined 
(Figure 6). The effect for RA deposits alone and OA deposits likewise shows exactly the 
same pattern, for each of the three years, but without reaching statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 6: Average deposit rate when deposit is required at time of 
acceptance, at time of publication, or unspecified (Condition C4). For each 
of the three years, requiring deposit at time of acceptance consistently 
generates a higher deposit rate for RA + OA considered jointly (upper 
histogram) as well as for OA (left) and RA (right) considered separately 
(lower histogram). 
When the deposit must be done is an especially important parameter in determining 
mandate effectiveness. Our interpretation is that requiring deposit at time of acceptance 
gives authors a much clearer and more specific time-marker than requiring deposit at 
time of publication. After submission, refereeing, revision and resubmission, successful 
authors receive a dated letter from the journal notifying them that their final draft has now been accepted for publication. That is the natural point in authors’ workflow to 
deposit their final draft: They know the acceptance date then, and they have the final 
draft in hand. Publication date, in contrast, is uncertain: Authors don’t know when the 
published version will appear, the delay (“publication lag”) following acceptance can be 
quite long (sometimes months or even years), the calendar date on the published issue 
may not correspond to the actual date it appeared, and by the time the article is 
published the author may no longer have the final draft available for deposit. Requiring 
deposit at an unspecified date is even vaguer, and probably closer to not requiring 
deposit at all.  
 
 
Figure 7: Average deposit latencies (delays relative to publication date = 
0). There is no interpretable effect of deposit timing requirements 
(Condition C4) on average deposit latencies, either for RA + OA (shown), 
or for RA and OA separately.  
One would expect the deposit timing requirement (Condition C4) to have an effect not 
only on deposit rate but also on deposit latency, i.e., the time at which the deposit is 
done; yet no interpretable pattern or statistical significance was observed across the 
three years for RA, OA or RA + OA (Figure 7). RA deposits are eventually converted to 
OA (as the OA embargo elapses) so it may be that the latency effect takes the form of 
more early RA deposits, which later become OA, rather than making either RA or OA 
deposits themselves occur earlier. Below, however, we will find that it is the internal-use 
condition (C7) that has a significant effect on deposit latency.  
Which version must be deposited (the author’s final draft or the publisher’s version of 
record -- MELIBEA Condition C3) might also be expected to have an effect on deposit 
rate and/or latency, but it was not possible to make the comparison, because of our 
exclusion criteria: Before excluding the institutions that had fewer than 30 publications 
or Webometric rank beyond 5000, mandates requiring deposit of the author’s version 
did have a significantly higher deposit rate than those requiring deposit of the 
publisher’s version. But once the weaker institutions were excluded, almost all the 
remaining policies required the author’s version, so no comparison was possible. This pattern is consistent, however, with the interpretation that requiring deposit immediately 
upon acceptance generates more deposits, and hence more deposits of the author’s 
final draft. As there are more publisher restrictions on the later publisher’s version than 
on the earlier author’s version, and as many authors are reluctant to put their chances 
of getting published at risk by challenging their publishers’ restrictions, it is to be 
expected that the compliance rate for the author’s version will be higher, and also that 
deposit will be done sooner, with papers initially deposited as RA and then made OA 
after the publisher OA embargo has elapsed. 
Effect of Internal-Use Condition (C7) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
When it is stipulated that deposit is required “For internal use” (Condition C7), deposit 
rates are significantly higher for OA and RA deposits combined (Figure 8). The effect is 
larger and significant for RA deposits alone and smaller but in the same direction for OA 
deposits alone. With an internal-use requirement, deposit latency is also significantly 
shorter for OA and RA combined, but this time the effect is larger and significant for OA 
deposits alone, smaller and not significant for RA deposits alone (Figure 9). (Note that 
especially for 2013 this measurement in April 2014 was probably too early for a reliable 
estimate because the average delay of about 175 days for mandates without an 
internal-use requirement had not yet been reached in April 2014. Similarly, the deposit 
rate for 2011 may be inflated because papers published in that year had the longest 
time to get deposited by April 2014.)  
   
Figure 8: Average deposit rates, with and without internal use. For each of 
the three years, average OA + RA deposit rates are higher when the 
deposit is required for internal institutional use (e.g., research evaluation; 
Condition C7). The pattern is the same for OA alone (left) and RA alone 
(right), for each of the three years, but the deposit rate difference is bigger 
for RA. 
 
  
Figure 9: For each of the three years the average OA + RA deposit 
latencies are shorter when there is a requirement to deposit for internal 
use (Condition C7). (Higher is later, lower is earlier; 0 is the date of 
publication; latency is in days, relative to publication date). The pattern is 
the same for OA alone (left) and RA alone (right) for each of the three 
years, but the effect is bigger for OA.  
The internal-use requirement pertains mostly to research performance evaluation, on 
which a researcher’s rank and salary often depend. Hence it is predictable that 
researchers will be eager to make their papers available for this purpose by depositing 
them (Rentier & Thirion 2011). And since internal use only requires deposit, not OA, it is 
also predictable that this requirement will have a stronger effect on RA deposit than on 
OA deposit. What is a little surprising is that an internal-use requirement accelerates OA 
deposits more than RA deposits. This may be because our latency data were noisier 
and had more gaps (missing data) than our deposit data. It could also be because RA 
deposits occur earlier than OA deposits in any case (because of publisher OA 
embargoes), leaving less room for shortening their latency even further. Or it may be 
because the internal-use requirement (C7) has the effect of reinforcing the deposit-
upon-acceptance requirement (C4) for OA deposits (those that have no publisher OA 
embargo with which the author wishes to comply): “You have to deposit immediately on acceptance anyway, for performance evaluation, so you may as well make it OA 
immediately too, rather than RA.” 
 
Effect of Opt-Out Condition (C2) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
The last policy condition that proved significant concerned the right to waive or opt out 
of a requirement (Condition C2): We looked at the subset of mandates where the author 
was required both to deposit and to make the deposit OA, but was allowed to opt out of 
the OA requirement (only) (i.e., the deposit could be RA instead of OA). In particular, 
the effect concerned whether (i) unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement was 
allowed or (ii) the author had to negotiate each opt-out individually, on a conditional, 
case-by-case basis. We found that an OA requirement allowing unconditional opt-out 
generates a higher deposit rate than an OA requirement allowing only a conditional opt-
out (Figure 10). This result might seem paradoxical at first, because in a sense a 
“requirement” that allows an unconditional opt-out is not a requirement at all! So why 
would it generate a higher deposit rate than a requirement allowing only a conditional 
opt-out? We think the answer is in the component of the requirement from which no opt-
out at all is allowed, namely, the deposit requirement itself: The internal-use 
requirement (C7) reinforces compliance with the immediate-deposit requirement (C4). In 
contrast, having to negotiate opt-out from the OA requirement case-by-case (conditional 
OA opt-out) inhibits compliance with the immediate-deposit requirement, whereas the 
possibility of unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement (C2) reinforces compliance 
with the immediate-deposit requirement. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 10: When deposit is required (no opt out) but authors can opt out of 
OA unconditionally (Condition C2), deposit rates are higher than when 
each individual OA opt-out has to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. 
The effect is especially strong for RA (lower right); for each of the three 
years OA (lower left) and OA+RA (above) show the same pattern as RA 
(above). 
 
Figure 11: There is no consistent, interpretable effect of conditional vs. 
unconditional OA opt-out (Condition C2) on deposit latencies across the 
years. (Only OA + RA shown here) All the data on deposit rates and deposit latencies can be thought of as measures of 
mandate compliance rates. In the case of the effect of allowing unconditional opt-out 
from the OA requirement, the biggest observed increase is in RA deposits, and our 
interpretation is that authors are more likely to comply with a deposit requirement if they 
can choose to deposit as RA rather than OA whenever they feel it is necessary, without 
the prospect of having to do individual case-by-case negotiation for a waiver of the OA 
requirement. Knowing that making the deposit OA is optional makes it more likely that 
an author will comply with the requirement to deposit-on-acceptance – or even to 
deposit at all.  
Power of Updated MELIBEA Score to Predict Deposit Rate 
The original option-values and condition-weightings in the formula for the MELIBEA 
score were initialized largely on the basis of guesswork. Those initial values and 
weightings can and should be updated as empirical evidence accrues, so as to increase 
their power to predict mandate strength. Using the present findings on the association of 
Conditions C2 (Opt-Out), C4 (Deposit Timing) and C7 (Internal Use), we have updated 
option-values and condition-weightings in order to reflect the findings of this study: 
Higher values have been assigned to those options that our t-tests and ANOVAs 
showed to be predictive of deposit rate and latency (Table 2). We have also re-weighted 
the MELIBEA formula for mandate strength, assigning zero weight to the two irrelevant 
conditions (C1, Mandate/Request and C8, Theses) and equal weights to the rest 
(Figure 12). 
0(𝐶1) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶2) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶3) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶4) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶5) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶6) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ1(𝐶7) ﾠ𝑥 ﾠ0(𝐶8) 
Figure 12: Updates of the initial weights on the eight conditions (C1-C8) in 
MELIBEA’s formula for mandate strength based on the findings of the 
present study. Condition C1 (Mandate or Request) dropped because this 
study only considers mandates. Condition C8 (Theses) dropped because 
this study considers only journal articles. All other weights are set as one. 
  
Table 2: Updated values for the MELIBEA mandate strength score (Table 
1), based on the findings of the present study. Higher values have been 
assigned to the options that t-tests and ANOVAs showed to be predictive 
of deposit rate and latency. 
We make no claim that the new values and weightings are as yet optimal. A larger 
sample may well bring other conditions and their options into play as more mandates 
are adopted. In addition, latency effects will be clearer with a more complete and 
accurate sample than the present one. Nor are deposit rates and latencies the only 
criterion against which one might wish to validate mandate strength estimators. 
However, it is clear that our evidence-based updates of the initial values and weights 
already do increase the power of the MELIBEA Score to predict deposit rate (though not 
latency). The correlations in Figure 13 are all higher than those in Figure 5, and 
especially dramatically so for RA deposits. 
 
 
Figure 13: Correlation between updated MELIBEA mandate strength score 
and deposit rate, by publication year, for RA deposits, OA deposits and RA 
+ OA deposits jointly, with values and weights updated to reflect the 
findings of this study. (Cf. Figure 5). (The correlations with latency 
remained inconsistent and uninterpretable.) 
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OALimitations 
This is an exploratory study in which we made predictions in advance as to which 
variables we expected to have an effect on deposit rates and latency, in which direction, 
and why. As only the three predicted variables had significant effects, we did not apply a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple tests (though we tested many other variables). We 
take the replication of the direction of the effects (whether significant or insignificant) -- 
across the three independent time periods, and for RA + OA jointly as well as for RA 
and OA separately -- to further decrease the likelihood that the observed pattern of 
effects was due to chance.  
(1) The data from multiple databases have limitations because they are incomplete, 
noisy and approximate. We have publication data from the top 12,000 journals, but we 
only have access to the full deposit and publication date of a portion of them. The 
latency data are especially noisy and incomplete. 
(2) The short (3-year) time window for which we have deposit rate and latency data 
provides a narrowing picture of changes across time, especially for the most recent 
year, 2013. For the articles published earliest in the 3-year time window (2011) the 
deposit rates have stabilized and the latency averages are based on a long enough 
time-base (2.5 years), whereas the deposit rates for articles published in the second 
half of 2013 are based on a time window of less than a year.  
(3) MELIBEA’s classification and weighting of OA mandates was provisional: the 
initialized option-values and condition-weights were not yet validated and somewhat 
subjective. As the number and age of the mandates increases and the ranking and 
classification system is updated and optimized, the data should become less noisy and 
variable. Moreover, if new mandates adopt the conditions that have already emerged as 
most important from the present analysis, both the rate and speed of deposit are likely 
be enhanced.  
Summary and Conclusions 
Our first finding was that the higher an institution’s MELIBEA score for OA mandate 
strength, the higher was the rate of deposit in its institutional repository for each year, 
but the correlation was small, and was significant only for OA + RA deposits jointly and 
for OA deposits alone, but not for RA deposits alone. There was also no correlation with 
latency.  
In an effort to increase the predictive power of the MELIBEA score for mandate strength 
and to determine the effects of its conditions individually, we analyzed three of the eight 
conditions separately to test their effects on deposit rate and latency. (Two of the other 
MELIBEA conditions were irrelevant because they pertained to non-mandates or to 
theses, respectively, and for the remaining three the sample was too small to test them 
separately.) The three conditions we examined were (C4) when the author had to do the 
deposit (upon acceptance, upon publication, or unspecified; (C7) whether the deposit was required for internal use (such as performance evaluation) and (C2) whether the 
author could opt out of the requirement to make the deposit OA unconditionally or only 
conditionally, on a case-by-case basis.  
For the deposit-timing condition (C4), the requirement to deposit immediately upon 
acceptance generated significantly higher deposit rates for OA + RA deposits combined. 
The pattern was also the same for RA and OA separately, and for each individual year, 
but there was no consistent or significant effect on deposit latency.  
For the internal-use condition (C7), requiring deposit for internal use generated 
significantly higher deposit rates for OA + RA deposits combined. The pattern was also 
the same for RA and OA separately, and for each individual year, but the rate-increase 
was larger for RA than for OA. The internal-use requirement had an effect on latency as 
well: Deposit is done earlier when it is required for internal use (same pattern for RA + 
OA, RA, OA, and for each year), but the latency-decrease effect is larger for OA than for 
RA.  
Our interpretation for C7 is that when the deposit is required for internal use, more 
authors who may feel inhibited by a publisher OA embargo from depositing OA go 
ahead and deposit RA rather than not depositing at all or waiting for the end of the 
publisher OA embargo to deposit. This is what increases the rate of RA deposit. For the 
OA deposits, which tend to be done later than RA deposits (because of publisher OA 
embargoes), the effect of their being needed for internal use is to reduce their latency 
(i.e., speed them up). RA deposits tend to be done much earlier than OA deposits. 
For the opt-out condition (C2), allowing unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement 
(but not the deposit requirement) generated significantly higher deposit rates for OA + 
RA deposits combined. The pattern was the same for RA and OA separately, and for 
each individual year, but the effect was especially marked for RA. (There was no effect 
on latency.) Our interpretation for C2 is that authors are more likely to comply with a 
deposit requirement if they know they can choose to deposit as RA rather than OA 
unconditionally.  
Using our findings on the effects of these three conditions, we updated the initial option-
values and condition-weightings of the MELIBEA formula for mandate strength with the 
result that its correlation with deposit rate increased overall, and especially for RA 
deposits. There is still no correlation with deposit latency, but as RA deposits eventually 
become OA deposits, increases in RA may reflect earlier deposit of papers that might 
otherwise only have been deposited later, as OA. (Note that RA deposits are indirectly 
accessible even during the OA embargo through individual user requests via the 
repository’s request-a-copy Button; Sale et al 2014.) 
Our updating of a subset of the MELIBEA values and weights shows that in 
combination, three at least of the MELIBEA parameters can already predict deposit rate 
– and hence reflect mandate strength -- better than the original MELIBEA overall score. This is just an illustration of how further research can be used to keep optimizing the 
predictive power of estimators of mandate strength. 
Practically speaking, it also emerges from this analysis that the deposit-on-acceptance 
requirement, internal-use requirement, and the possibility of opting out of making the 
deposit OA unconditionally are each very important factors in the effectiveness of an OA 
mandate in generating greater author compliance and hence more deposits and more 
OA, sooner. As the rate of adoption of OA policies is now growing too, these findings 
make it possible for policy-makers to make them both more evidence-based and more 
effective by taking these findings into account in designing their mandates. 
This study was based on institutional mandates rather than funder mandates, because it 
is easier to identify total journal output for an institution’s researchers than for a funder’s 
grantees, but there is no reason to think the conclusions do not apply to both kinds of 
mandates.  
References 
Archambault, É. (2013). The Tipping Point: Open Access Comes of Age. In ISSI 2013 
Proceedings of 14th International Society of Scientometrics and Informetrics 
Conference (Vol. 1, pp. 1165-1680). http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Temp/ISSI-
ARchambeault.pdf  
Berners-Lee, T. (1989). Information management: A proposal. 
http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html  
Björk, B.C., Welling, P., Laakso, M., Majlender, P., Hedlund, T., & Guðni, G. (2010). 
Open Access to the scientific journal literature: Situation 2009. PLOS ONE, 5(6), 
e11273. http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0011273   
Björk, B. C., Laakso, M., Welling, P., & Paetau, P. (2014). Anatomy of green open 
access. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 65(2), 237-
250. http://openaccesspublishing.org/apc8/Personal%20VersionGreenOa.pdf  
BOAI (2002) Budapest Open Access Initiative. 
http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org  
Chen, X. (2014). Open Access in 2013: Reaching the 50% Milestone. Serials Review, 
40(1), 21-27. 
Edgington, E., & Onghena, P. (2007). Randomization tests. CRC Press. 
Gargouri, Y, Larivière, V & Harnad, S (2013) Ten-year Analysis of University of Minho 
Green OA Self-Archiving Mandate In E Rodrigues, A Swan & AA Baptista, Eds. Uma  
Década  de Acesso Aberto e na UMinho no Mundo. U Minho 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/358882/  
Gargouri, Y., Larivière, V., Gingras, Y., & Harnad, S. (2012). Green and gold Open 
Access percentages and growth, by discipline. In É. Archambault, Y. Gingras, & V. Larivière (Eds.), Proceedings of 17th International Conference on Science and 
Technology Indicators. Montréal, Canada 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340294/1/stiGargouri.pdfhttp://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340294/1/sti
Gargouri.pdf  
Gargouri, Y., Hajjem, C., Larivière, V., Gingras, Y., Carr, L., Brody, T., & Harnad, S. 
(2010). Self-selected or mandated, open access increases citation impact for higher 
quality research. PloS one, 5(10). http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0013636  
Harnad, S. (2006) Opening Access by Overcoming Zeno's Paralysis, in Jacobs, N., Eds. 
Open Access: Key Strategic, Technical and Economic Aspects. Chandos. 
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12094/  
Harnad, S., Brody, T., Vallieres, F., Carr, L., Hitchcock, S., Gingras, Y, Oppenheim, C., 
Stamerjohanns, H., & Hilf, E. (2004) The green and the gold roads to Open Access. 
Nature Web Focus. http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/accessdebate/21.html    
Harvard University Library (2012) Major Periodical Subscriptions Cannot Be Sustained. 
Faculty Advisory Council Memorandum on Journal Pricing 
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup143448  
Hitchcock, S. (2013) The effect of open access and downloads ('hits') on citation impact: 
a bibliography of studies. http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html 
http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html  
Khabsa, M., & Giles, C. L. (2014). The Number of Scholarly Documents on the Public 
Web. PloS one, 9(5), e93949. 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0093949%22%20%5Cl%20
%22pone-0093949-g003  
MELIBEA (2014) Directory and estimator policies for open access to scientific 
production. http://www.accesoabierto.net/politicas http://www.accesoabierto.net/politicas  
 
Miller, FP, Vandome, AF, McBrewster J (2010) Serials Crisis. VDM Publishing 
Okerson, A., & O'Donnell, J. J. (Eds.). (1995). Scholarly journals at the crossroads: a 
subversive proposal for electronic publishing. Association of Research Libraries. 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003013520  
Rentier, B., & Thirion, P. (2011). The Liège ORBi model: Mandatory policy without rights 
retention but linked to assessment processes. Berlin 9 Prconference Workshop, 
November 2011, http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/jspui/bitstream/2268/102031/1/Rentier-WashDC-
2011.pdf  
ROAR (2014) Registry of Open Access Repositories. 
http://roar.eprints.org/information.html 
 ROARMAP (2014) Registry of Open Access Repositories Mandatory Archiving Policies. 
http://roarmap.eprints.org/ 
 
Sale, A., Couture, M., Rodrigues, E., Carr, L. and Harnad, S. (2014) Open Access 
Mandates and the "Fair Dealing" Button. In: Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian 
Culture Online (Rosemary J. Coombe & Darren Wershler, Eds.) 
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/18511/   
 
Suber, Peter (2008) Gratis and Libre Open Access. SPARC Open Access Newsletter. 
August 2008 http://www.sparc.arl.org/resource/gratis-and-libre-open-access  
 
Thomson-Reuters/ISI Web of Science. (2014). http://apps.webofknowledge.com  
 
Webometrics (2014). Ranking web of universities. 
http://www.webometrics.info/en/Methodology  
   